Foreign Policy Analysis Dersi 6. Ünite Özet

Introduction

Foreign policy preferences of states are not the same as foreign policy behaviours of states. While the former mainly refers to foreign policy predispositions and interests of states defined in a general and long-term perspective, the latter denotes the implementation of those preferences by dint of particular policy behaviours on the ground. While the former are more abstract and long-term oriented, the latter are more concrete and reflect shortterm calculations. Foreign policy preferences are about how states think they could achieve their national interests abroad in long-term perspective. Behaviours are particular policies to be implemented in the field. Preferences are about what those foreign policy interests are, whereas behaviours are about how those interests can be achieved.

Alternative Foreign Policy Preferences

Isolationism

Isolationism suggests that states would not want to get involved in political developments taking place outside their territorial borders (Barumoeller, 2010, 349-371). They might think that they have the power capability to protect their territorial integrity and other key national interests by isolating themselves from the external environment. Isolationist states tend to believe that their geographical location, power capabilities, and the nature of the terrain on which they sit would protect them against external threats. Countries which tend to pursue isolationist foreign policies generally believe that they are self-sufficient and capable of meeting all their needs on their own. On the other hand, the feeling of weakness might also equally lead to isolationist thinking in that the more active they become outside their borders, the more they would be exposed to external challenges and their interests would come under danger. Countries which think they are extremely fragile in terms of their internal characteristics might decide to stay as far away as possible from international developments and entering long term interactions with other states. Pursuing internationalist policies might incur unbearable costs in their internal affairs. The more relations they establish with other countries and the more active they become in the internal affairs of others, the more likely others might also interfere in their internal affairs.

Internationalism

Unlike isolationism, internationalism assumes that states define their national identity and interests in such a way to underline the interests and identities that they share with others in common. From the perspective of internationalism, states think they can achieve their foreign policy interests through close interactions and cooperation with other states in the system. Isolationism and protectionism are discarded in favor of developing closer bonds with other states in different policy realms.

Internationalism holds out that all states sail on the same ship and they need to align their policies with each other in order not to lose in the globalizing world. The underlying assumption here is that the shrinking of the world paves the way for a global community of nation states to emerge. Further integration within a globalizing environment would push states to cooperate with a view to find solutions to common problems and challenges. Internationalism owes a great part of its existence as a foreign policy preference to the liberal conceptualization of international relations, thereby states could mitigate the negative consequences of anarchical structure of international relations and bring into existence a community of common interests and identities by increasing interdependency and cooperation among each other (Dunne and McDonald, 2013, 1-17).

Countries which pursue internationalism as a foreign policy course also tend to believe that it is in their national interests to bring about a particular regional or international environment in line with their national priorities. Liberal internationalists support multilateralism whereas neoconservatives are in favor of unilateralism.

Liberal internationalists support democracy promotion through international organizations, diplomatic channels, and multilateral efforts whereas neo-conservatives feel comfortable with using brute force in promoting democracy.

Alliances and Balancing

Alliance relations are different from all others in that members of alliances commit to each other’s security, survival, and territorial integrity and promise to come each other’s aid in case any of them were attacked by countries outside the alliance. Compared to all other cooperative engagements, alliances signify a much deeper cohesion among its members (Johnson, 2017, 736-745). This cohesion and we-feeling might be constructed on the basis of common identity and values or common strategic security interests. The cohesion and harmony would be the highest if alliance members united around both common identity and common interests. The best example in this regard would be NATO, the collective defense organization which came into existence in the immediate aftermath of the Second World War.

Unlike collective defense organizations, collective security organizations are much looser in terms of their scope and cohesion. Rather than joining collective defense organizations, membership in collective security organizations might appear a much more attractive foreign policy preference to many states. In such organizations, security is defined indivisible and this offers a great maneuvering capability to its members. Rather than defining a particular country or a group of countries as threats, membership in collective security organizations suggests that members are united around common principles, norms and rules as regards interstate relations.

The existence of formal organizational structure is what separates hard-balancing attempts from soft-balancing exercises. In the case of the latter, a group of countries strategically cooperate among each other to deal with common security threats and challenges more effectively, yet they shun away from forming formal alliance organizations (Paul, 2005, 46-71).

Membership in alliances offers its members various benefits. The first and the most important is an iron-clad commitment to their survival and territorial integrity. The security protection provided by the most powerful members of the alliance might also enable the junior members to divert their limited material power capabilities to other tasks, such as economic development and social welfare. Second, membership in alliances might also serve as ideational glue tying all members to each other. Feeling as part of the same family of nations might provide its members with status.

Neutrality

Neither isolationism nor internationalism precludes the possibility of adopting neutrality as a foreign policy preference. Neutral states do not take sides in regional or international power competitions. They can achieve this through either isolating themselves from the outside world or trying to develop sustainable functional relations with many states. However, one need to underline that remaining neutral would not always be left to the unilateral discretion of the concerned country. States might declare that they would from now on maintain neutrality. Yet, for such intentions to be respected by others, other states should also give their approval. Neutrality is a risky decision to take because if other states do not recognize the neutrality claims of the party concerned, the latter might lie in the middle of geopolitical confrontations between rival power blocks. Despite all intentions to remain neutral, such states might be targeted by other states during times of war

Hard-Power Versus Soft-Power

A group of academics, nested in different disciplines and inspired by the pioneering works of Joseph Nye (2004), have popularized the concept of soft power in their attempts at explaining the internal character and foreign policies of such global powers as the United States and the European Union. Robert Kagan (2003) is one of those intellectuals who contributed to the growing salience of academic studies on power. He compared the United States to the European Union and came to the conclusion that the former is a typical hard power whereas the latter can be better defined as a soft power. Some other scholars who study the concept of power makes a comparison between the EU on the one hand and other great powers on the other, particularly the United States, Russia and China, in that whereas the EU is predisposed to use soft power tools abroad, the latter tend to employ traditional hard power capabilities (Laidi, 2008).

Soft power has become more relevant in foreign policy preferences of states as the realpolitik mentality of the Cold War times has been replaced by the logic of integration, interdependence, and globalization following the demise of the Soviet Union and the projected triumph of liberal democracy. The increasing interconnectedness among different nations, the rise of non-state actors in global politics, the growing attempts at regional and international integration, and the decreasing appeal of traditional hard power instruments appear to have led many pundits to argue that soft power has now become the new lingua franca of global power politics

Power is the ability of one actor to influence the behavior, interest, and identity of other actors in the image of its own priorities, preferences, and values. This means that power has both residual and relational aspects. It is residual because being powerful means that a particular state possesses some capabilities, of both tangible and intangible sorts, that would enable it to have an impact on the choices and actions of others.

Three different variables matter with respect to meaning and relevancy of the concept of power. One variable concerns the will of actors to be powerful and influence the choices of others. The second variable is the capabilities of actors at their disposal. The third variable is the perception of the power seeker actor in the eyes of the actors that stand at the receiving end of this relationship.

The Will Dimension

Not all states are willing to have an influence on the choices of others. Some states are defined as status-quo oriented powers whereas some others are considered as status-seekers or status-quo challengers. Status-quo oriented states are those that are content with the current power configuration in the system and they do not aspire to change it. They are merely concerned with their existing status within the system and want to make sure that it continues. Their foreign policies most of the time begin and end at their national borders. They do not have an intention to see a new system emerge so that they would be in a much better, prestigious, or powerful status. They are generally risk-averse states. Rather than act, they react to external developments.

The Capability Dimension of Power

The capability dimension of power puts the focus on power capabilities of actors in a nonrelational fashion. Rather than how other states within the system perceive the power capabilities of the actor in question, what is important here is the way how the state that wants to have an impact on the choices and values of others thinks from which sources its power capabilities emanate. In this sense, some states are defined as hard powers, meaning that the tangible power capabilities at their disposal would enable them to influence the choices and values of other states. Hard power capabilities can be of both military and nonmilitary in nature. Therefore, the assumption that the states relying on military capabilities should be defined as hard powers whereas the others that rely on economic capabilities as soft powers would not be appropriate. After all, economic power capabilities are also hard. Even though they are more of a civilian than military character, hard powers can equally employ economic power instruments in such a way to change the calculations of others. Therefore, a much better categorization would take place if one puts the potential hard powers into two main groups, coercive powers and inducing/enticing/coaxing powers. Coercive powers are those that try to get what they want from others by coercing them to meet their choices. They simply offer others two alternative choices. Others would either agree to their terms or get punished severely for their non-compliance. Stated somewhat differently, coercive powers would put an ultimatum on others. Others would either take. it or leave their destiny at the mercy of the coercer. Coercive powers would frighten their opponents and threaten them with the negative consequences of their non-cooperation. On the other hand, inducing/enticing/coaxing powers are those that would try to get what they want from others by asking others to make materially construed cost-benefit calculations. Their hope is that others would be induced if they saw that their cooperation with the inducer would yield to them more benefits than costs. These powers would employ both carrots and sticks in their dealings with others. Rather than imposing their will on others through the employment of coercive strategies in a unilateral fashion, they would endeavour to buy their cooperation by pushing others to engage in a cost-benefit calculation. Soft powers lay at the opposite end of the power capability dimension. Soft powers rely on intangible capabilities, such as identity, culture, norms, values, the legitimacy of their internal and external policies, and disinformation capability. Their ability to help shape the choices of others originate from their power capabilities that cannot easily be quantified or subjected to objective measurement. Soft powers can also be defined as persuasive soft powers, which are those that think they need to invest some capital in order to help create legitimacy and attraction in the eyes of others. They develop specific strategies not only to brandish their achievements but also persuade others that their behaviours and policies are legitimate and other-regarding. The least soft and the most illegitimate form of soft power is sharp power. Sharp powers can also be defined as manipulative soft powers. Unlike persuasive powers which try to invest in their image and attraction abroad with benign intentions, manipulative soft powers try to manipulate and deceive the public opinion of other states through the adoption of deceitful disinformation strategies. Their efforts to help build positive image about themselves are overshadowed by their efforts to fabricate negative images about their rivals and competitors.

The Relational Dimension of Power

In this regard one can talk about different power relationships. One is the coercive power relationship. Here, one needs to demonstrate that the state B changes its decisions and meets the demands of the state A, if and only if the former feels frightened of the coercive capabilities of the latter. The existence of fear needs to be demonstrated in its all clarity. In the case of inducing power relationship, the state B needs to comply with the demands of the state A out of material calculations. In the case of attractive power relationship, the state B does not need to engage in cost-benefit calculations before deciding as to whether to comply with the demands of the state A. In the case of persuasive power relationship, what matters is that any change in the behaviours of the state B needs to take place through the successes of the persuasive strategies that the state A employs.